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Real Property
by Robert L. Foreman, Jr.*
T. Daniel Brannan**
and
Stephen M. LaMastra***
Perhaps because of the recession's adverse effect on real estate activity
in Georgia, there have been fewer real property cases decided during the
survey period than in recent years. However, there were several significant legislative enactments during the year. From decisions affecting the
priority of lienholders to increased environmental legislation to several
significant cases defining the obligations on a lender in a foreclosure sale,
there have been a number of important developments in the past year of
which real estate practitioners must be aware.
I.

LAND LINES AND BOUNDARIES

In an interesting case concerning Henry County's acquisition of a road
right of way by prescription, the Supreme Court of Georgia held that,
"the standard thirty foot width used for most rights of way is applicable
only to roads which are formally acquired by a county."' In Clack v.
Henry County,2 Clack had built a dam on his property abutting an unpaved county road. Neither Clack nor the previous owner had ever formally dedicated the road to Henry County; rather, the county had acquired its sixteen foot right of way by prescription. At trial, the county
maintained that its right of way was thirty feet wide.'
* Of Counsel to the firm of Alston & Bird, Atlanta, Georgia. University of North Carolina
(B.A., 1946); Harvard University (LL.B., 1949). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
'**Partner in the firm of Morris, Manning & Martin, Atlanta, Georgia. Georgia State
University (A.B., 1979); Mercer University (J.D., 1982). Member, Mercer Law Review (19801982); Georgia Survey Editor (1981-1982). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
*** Associate in the firm of Alston & Bird, Atlanta, Georgia. Wake Forest University
(B.A., 1987); Vanderbilt University (J.D., 1990). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. Clack v. Henry County, 261 Ga. 623, 409 S.E.2d 647 (1991).
2. 261 Ga. 623, 409 S.E.2d 647 (1991).
3. Id. at 623, 409 S.E.2d at 647.
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The supreme court held that the county's right to a roadway in cases of
acquisition by prescription depends on the roadway's historical use, not
on an express dedication of the property as a county roadway.' Thus, in
such cases no acquisition exists beyond the area of actual use of the road
in question. Therefore, because the road was only sixteen feet wide in'the
area abutting Clack's property, the county could not assume or impose a
thirty foot right of way upon Clack's property.
The court held that the dam, which Clack had constructed, and which
caused the modification of the county roadway, did not encroach on the
county's right of way in a manner sufficient to require its removal or substantial redudtion. 6 In addition, the court held that Clack had not trespassed upon Henry County property because at trial, the court based its
determination of trespass on the erroneous conclusion that the county's
right of way was thirty feet wide.7 Because the right of way was actually
only sixteen feet wide at that point, Clack's dam did not constitute a trespass upon county property.
I.

SECURITY DEEDS

Under section 44-5-62 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated
("O.C.G.A."), s a general warranty deed in Georgia includes a covenant
that the purchaser takes the property free from encumbrances. This section applies whether such encumbrances are known or unknown to the
seller at the time of transfer. In Northside Title & Abstract Co. v. Simmons,9 the supreme court decided whether a subsequent transferee of real
property is entitled to recover from a remote transferor for breach of the
warranty set forth in such a general warranty deed. In Northside Title,
appellee, Cynthia Simmons, and her co-tenant had conveyed property to
Wooster by general warranty deed. At the time of this conveyance, a federal tax lien against the property existed. Wooster subsequently conveyed
the property to Fulton Federal Savings 0and Loan Association, and the
federal tax lien remained on the record.'
Fulton Federal subsequently assigned its claim for breach of warranty
to Northside Title & Abstract Company. While Simmons had transferred
the property by general warranty deed to Wooster, Wooster had trans4.

Id., 409 S.E.2d at 648.

5. Id.
6.
7.
8.
claims
9.
10.

Id. at 624, 409 S.E.2d at 648.
Id.; 409 S.E.2d at 649.
O.C.G.A. § 44-5-62 (1982). This section provides that a warranty of title "against the
of all persons includes covenants . . . [and] freedom from encumbrances." Id.
200 Ga. App. 892, 409 S.E.2d 885 (1991).
Id. at 892, 409 S.E.2d at 885.
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ferred the property to Fulton Federal by limited warranty deed "subject
to any encumbrances of record," which included the federal tax lien."
Fulton Federal could not hold Wooster liable for breach of warranty, because Wooster's limited warranty in favor of Fulton Federal explicitly excluded matters of record.12
The court in Northside Title cited O.C.G.A. section 44-5-60(a) 13 for the
proposition that a subsequent transferee may recover for breach from the
grantor of an original general warranty deed. 4 Therefore, the court held
that Fulton Federal, and Northside Title by assignment; had a valid
claim for breach only against Simmons because Simmons had given a
general warranty deed.1 5 Under Georgia law, unless a covenant expressly
negates such a transmission, a warranty of title, of quiet enjoyment, and
of freedom from encumbrances made by any grantor passes with the
property to subsequent transferees."
The decision in Northside Title is significant in that it reaffirms the
rights of a subsequent transferee against a remote grantor of a general
warranty deed. The implication of this case to parties conveying title to
real property by warranty deed is clear. Unless a grantor is confident that
no outstanding liens or encumbrances exist on real property being conveyed, the grantor should transfer by a warranty deed specifically subject
to encumbrances or liens of record.
During this survey period, the supreme court considered the issue of
superiority of a security deed over the unrecorded interest of a former
husband. 7 In Eavenson v. Parker," the supreme court reversed the trial
court's decision awarding a wife's interest in evenly divided real property
to her former husband (Mr. Parker), while rejecting the claim of the

11. Id., 409 S.E.2d at 886.
12. Id., 409 S.E.2d at 885.
13. O.C.G.A. § 44-5-60(a) (1982) provides in part that:
purchaser of lands obtains with the title, whether conveyed to him at public or
private sale, all. the rights which any former owner of the land under whom he
claims may have had by virtue of any covenants of warranty of title, of quiet
enjoyment, or of freedom from encumbrances contained in the conveyance from
any former grantor unless the transmission of such covenants with the land is
expressly prohibited in the covenant itself.

Id.
14. 200 Ga. App. at 893, 409 S.E.2d at 886-87 (citing Tucker v. McArthur, 103 Ga. 409,
30 S.E. 283 (1897) and Smith v. Smith, 129 Ga. App. 618, 200 S.E.2d 504 (1973)).
15. Id., 409 S.E.2d at 887.
16. Eavenson v. Parker, 261 Ga. 607, 409 S.E.2d 520 (1991).
17. Id. at 608, 409 S.E.2d at 521. The decree provided that Mr. Parker was to make
payments on marital debts, and that such payments would be credited to him when the
Parkers' property was sold so that he would receive an appropriate share of the proceeds
from the sale of the property and the distribution of marital assets. Id.
18. 261 Ga. 607, 409 S.E.2d 520 (1991).
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holder of a security deed from the former wife (Mrs. Parker) conveying
her undivided half interest in the property. 9
The pertinent facts in Eavenson were as follows: (1) As part of their
divorce, it was agreed that the Parkers would sell their property and divide the proceeds equally; (2) the divorce decree provided that certain
payments of marital debts made by Mr. Parker would be deducted from
Mrs. Parker's share of the proceeds upon the sale of the property; (3)
Mrs. Parker subsequently by security deed conveyed to Eavenson her undivided half interest in the property; (4) no notice of lis pendens, as required by O.C.G.A. section 44-14-610,20 was filed subsequent to the Complaint for Divorce; and (5) no notice of the divorce decree and its
provisions, or of Mr. Parker's interest in Mrs. Parker's share of the property, was ever entered into the execution docket or real estate records, as
required by O.C.G.A. section 9-12-86(b)."
The court in Eavenson held that, as to Mrs. Parker's share of the property, Eavenson was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of Mr.
Parker's interest in that share.2 2 Thus, Eavenson's interest by virtue of
the security deed is superior to that of Mr. Parker.23 The rule followed in
this case is the well-established principle that a bona fide purchaser for
value without notice will have a claim superior to that of the holder of a
prior unrecorded interest.
Another case concerning controversy over failure to record a legal document is Dime Savings Bank v. Sandy Springs Associates, Inc.,2 4 involving a notice of lis pendens and an unrecorded security deed. In Dime Savings, the supreme court once again addressed the issue of priority of a
notice of lis pendens with respect to an unrecorded security deed.25 Although this case contrasts with the decision in Eavenson, the rulings in
the two cases are not incompatible.
After a series of complex transfers and transactions concerning the subject property, Sandy Springs Associates obtained a judgment against
Pearson, who had contracted to purchase the subject property, but never
complied with the escrow agreement and therefore never received a deed
to the property. The original seller had sold the property to Pearson's
wife instead, just after Sandy Springs Associates had obtained a judgment against Pearson in an unrelated matter. Pearson's wife then sold
the property to Poston, and Dime Savings loaned Poston a substantial
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 608, 409 S.E.2d at 521.
O.C.G.A. § 44-14-610 (1990).
261 Ga. at 608, 409 S.E.2d at 521; see O.C.G.A. § 9-12-86(b) (1982).
261 Ga. at 608, 409 S.E.2d at 521.
Id.
261 Ga. 485, 405 S.E.2d 491 (1991).
Id. at 485, 405 S.E.2d at 491.
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portion of the purchase money, secured by a deed to secure debt conveying the' property from Poston to Dime Savings and delivered on December 2, 1988. Dime Savings did not record its deed until December 30,
1988. In the meantime, Sandy Springs had filed an action in equity
against Mrs. Pearson to cancel the conveyance of the property to her and
also filed a notice of lis pendens on December 14, 1988; however, Sandy
Springs did not make other persons parties to this action.2
On appeal, the supreme court held that Sandy Springs Associates had
failed to join as defendants all those persons who would be adversely affected by cancellation of the conveyance; therefore, the trial court could
not grant the equitable relief sought.27 Finding that Mr. Pearson had only
an equitable interest in the property, rather than legal title, the court
held that such an equitable interest is not subject to ordinary levy and
sale. 8
Therefore, the court held that in order for Sandy Springs Associates to
collect on a judgment against an individual with an equitable interest in
property, Sandy Springs Associates must satisfy any other outstanding
debt on the property prior to levy and sale.2 9 The court noted that Sandy
Springs Associates had not followed the statutory procedure for collecting
its judgment and did not show peculiar facts justifying the equitable relief that Sandy Springs Associates had sought.8 0
The court in Dime Savings pointed out that "a bona fide purchaser for
value is protected against outstanding equitable interests in land of which
the purchaser has no notice."'" Therefore, a notice of lis pendens has no
effect on a prior unrecorded conveyance to a bona fide purchaser for
value. The authors believe that Eavenson's result may have been different if the husband had properly filed a notice of lis pendens. On the other
hand, in Dime Savings, a subsequent and properly filed notice of lis
pendens did not affect the unrecorded interest of a bona fide purchaser
for value. 2

26.

Id. at 485-86, 405 S.E.2d at 492.

27. Id. at 486, 405 S.E.2d at 492 (citing Mims v. Lifsey, 192 Ga. 366, 15 S.E.2d 440
(1941)). The court alsd cited O.C.G.A. § 9-11-19(a) (1982) for this rule of law, i.e., requiring
that one seeking equitable relief join in such action all those persons who could potentially
be adversely affected by an equitable proceeding as defendants in that proceeding. Id.
28. 261 Ga.at 487, 405 S.E.2d at 493 (citing Cook v. Securities Inv. Co., 184 Ga. 544, 192
S.E.179 (1937)).
29.

Id. See generally O.C.G.A. § 9-13-60 (1982).

30.

261 Ga. at 487, 405 S.E.2d at 493.

31.

Id. See O.C.G.A. §§ 23-1-19, -20 (1982), 18-2-22(z) (1991).

32.

261 Ga. at 435, 405 S.E.2d at 491.
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III. FORECLOSURE
During the survey period a significant case interpreting a sale under
power clause was McCollum v. Pope,33 in which the supreme court considered the issue of notice in an exercise of sale under power. 3 In a two
paragraph decision the court issued a stern warning to grantors of security deeds in Georgia: Actual receipt by a grantor of notice of an exercise
of sale under power is immaterial to the right of the grantee to conduct a
sale under power.3 5 Therefore, when a grantee mails notification of its
intent to conduct a sale under power, and does so within the guidelines
provided by the statute, a court will not invalidate such sale under power
even if the grantor does not receive said notice.
In another case concerning a creditor's sale under power, the court of
appeals upheld a trial court's confirmation of foreclosure based on the
creditor's expert's estimate of fair market value.30 In Marett Properties,
L.P. v. Centerbank Mortgage Co., 7 Centerbank foreclosed upon twentysix residential lots owned by Marett pursuant to a power of sale contained in a deed securing a loan of $777,000. Centerbank purchased the
lots for $700,000 and sought confirmation, which was granted pursuant to
O.C.G.A. section 44-14-161.38 Marett asserted on appeal that Centerbank
had erroneously included carrying costs in its appraisal for fair market
value, and that the trial court improperly accepted this value." The court
of appeals upheld the confirmation, finding that the trial court had "sufficient data in evidence upon which it could apply its own knowledge and
ideas so as to derive its own opinion as to the market value" of the property.'0 Although the court acknowledged that a legitimate concern with
the fair market value established at trial existed, it did not feel it was
appropriate to overrule the trial court on the factual matter of value.' 1
The court of appeals addressed an unusual foreclosure issue -in Georgia
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Brewer,42 holding that the mortgagee of improved property, which burned during the foreclosure pro33.
34.

261 Ga. 835, 411 S.E.2d 874 (1992).
Id. at 835, 411 S.E.2d at 874.

35. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.2 (1992)), the court pointed out that the statute requires only that notice be. in writing and sent, and shall be deemed given on the official
postmarked date. The statute contains no language requiring proof of receipt by grantor. Id.
36. Marett Properties, L.P. v. Centerbank Mortgage Co., No. A92A508 (Ga. Ct. App.
May 18, 1992).
37. No. A92A508 (Ga. Ct. App. May 18, 1992).
38. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-161 (1982).
39. No. A92A508 at 1.2.
40. Id. at 2 (citing HSL/La Jolla Belvedere Enters. v. Federal Say. & Co., 201 Ga. App.
447, 448, 411 S.E.2d 329, 331 (1991)).
41. Id.
42. 202 Ga. App. 127, 413 S.E.2d 770 (1991).
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ceedings instituted by the mortgagee, was, after completion of the foreclosure, entitled to insurance proceeds to the extent of his actual net loss,
that being the difference between the amount bid at foreclosure and the
value of the damaged property as established by its resale value.48 The
court stated that the right of a mortgagee to such proceeds is established
at the time of such loss.44 Therefore, the court held that insurance proceeds are to cover actual economic losses, and should not be reduced or
eliminated by factors beyond the control of the insured party. 45
The court of appeals addressed yet another foreclosure issue in
Vaughan v. Moore.46 In Vaughan the court of appeals upheld the trial
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant-grantor
Moore. 7 Moore had executed a promissory note and security deed in
favor of Vaughan. After Moore's default, Vaughan initiated an action
upon the note, and also sold the real property collateral at foreclosure
pursuant to power granted under the security deed. When Vaughan failed
to have the foreclosure sale confirmed as required by O.C.G.A. section 4414-161," ' Moore sought, and the trial court granted, summary judgment
in favor of Moore in the promissory note action.4
The court of appeals held that when a creditor pursues foreclosure to
initial conclusion, the creditor must then comply with O.C.G.A. section
44-14-161 to retain the right of "continued pursuit" of the additional
remedy of obtaining a judgment on the note.50 O.C.G.A. section 44-14161(a) provides that "no action may be taken to obtain a deficiency judgment unless the person instituting the 'foreclosure proceedings shall,
within 30 days after the sale, report the sale to the judge of the Superior
Court of the county in which the land is located for confirmation and
approval." 5' Therefore, the court held that because Vaughan foreclosed
on the collateral, property prior to obtaining a judgment on the note,
Vaughan was required to comply with the provisions of O.C.G.A. section
44-14-161, and obtain a confirmation, as a condition precedent to obtaining a deficiency judgment.5 2 Because Vaughan did not secure a confir-

43. Id. at 128, 413 S.E.2d at 771.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 130, 413 S.E.2d at 772.
46. 202 Ga. App. 592, 415 S.E.2d 47 (1992).
47. Id. at 592, 415 S.E.2d at 47.
48. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-161 (1982).
49. 202 at 592, 415 S.E.2d at 47.
50. Id. at 593-94, 415 S.E.2d at 47.
51.' O.C.G.A. § 44-14-161(a)(1982).
52. 202 Ga. App. at 593, 415 S.E.2d at 48. The decision in this case was based in part on
the rule established in Taylor v. Thomson, 158 Ga. App. 671, 282 S.E.2d 157 (1981).

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

mation, the court of appeals upheld the trial court's order of summary
judgment in favor of Moore.6
A significant case decided in the Eleventh Circuit of the United States
Court of Appeals was Grissom v.Johnson," because of its implications
for foreclosing lenders in an era of frequent borrower bankruptcies. Prior
to the ruling in Grissom, the so-called Durrett rule"' provided that a foreclosure sale could be set aside by a bankruptcy court in the event that the
foreclosure resulted in a sale of property for less than seventy percent of
the court determined market value of that property." This rule became
an important consideration and guideline for any foreclosing lender.
In Grissom the Eleventh Circuit removed this rigid guideline by holding that courts will consider several circumstances when reviewing a foreclosure sale.57 These factors include: (1) the specific facts of the situation;
(2) the fact that foreclosure sales often result in properties selling for below market price; and (3) the marketability of the property in question."9
Although the seventy percent guideline will remain a factor in these
cases, it will no longer be viewed as dispositive on the issue of reasonableness in a foreclosure sale. 9
The decision in Grissom has removed Durrett's bright-line test and replaced it with an analysis that allows -for a more realistic approach to
foreclosure sales and greater flexibility in judicial review of these foreclosures. This decision is an encouraging one for lenders in a period of falling real estate values and frequent borrower bankruptcies.
IV.

COVENANTS

Restrictive covenants have historically generated a great deal of litigation as some property owners have attempted to limit the scope of these
covenants while others have tried to use them in order to restrict broadly
the structures allowed within a given neighborhood or community. Interestingly enough, the Georgia Court of Appeals decided only one significant case dealing with restrictive covenants during the survey period.
, In Boehm v. Proctor," the court upheld the trial court's grant of a summary judgment motion in favor of defendant builders who had erected a
53. 202 Ga. App. at 593, 415 S.E.2d at 48.
54. 955 F.2d 1440 (11th Cir. 1992).
55. Durrett v. Washington National, 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980). Durrett stood for the
proposition that a foreclosure sale of a property could be reversed when such foreclosure
sale did not obtain at least 70% of the court-determined value of the property. Id. at 201.
56. Id. at 203.
57. 955 F.2d at 1440.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. 202 Ga, App. 869, 415 S.E.2d 490 (1992).
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structure in a subdivision with comprehensive restrictive covenants.6'
Plaintiffs in Boehm were several homeowners in a subdivision in Catoosa
County. The subdivision developer had recorded certain restrictive covenants in 1975. These restrictive covenants included specifications as to lot
and home size, and included a prohibition of structures of a temporary
nature. Defendant builders purchased a large lot in the subdivision in December 1990, and subsequently divided the lot into three separate parcels, each of which met the minimum size requirements of the covenants.
Then the defendant builders acquired the second floor of a conventionally
built house, moved it onto one of the parcels, and placed it upon a foundation as a permanent structure. After renovation, the single story house
contained about 2100 square feet.2
At trial, the court found that the house was not temporary, as plaintiffs
contended, and that defendants had not violated any other restrictive
covenant of the subdivision. As a result, the trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of defendant builders."
On appeal, the court in Boehm stated the fundamental principle of
Georgia property law: "the owner of land has the right to use it for any
lawful purpose, and restrictions upon its use must be clearly established
and strictly construed. '6 4 Strictly construing the covenants at issue, the
court held that the home built by defendant builders met all covenant
restrictions, including lot size, lot frontage, dwelling size, and nature of
dwelling." Therefore, the court held that the dwelling, although constructed in a fashion somewhat unique to the subdivision, nevertheless
complied with all necessary restrictions and covenants." Thus summary
judgment in favor of defendant builders was appropriate and was
upheld."7
61. The covenants provided in part that
"(1) no lot shall be used except for residential purposes. No building shall be erected, altered, placed or permitted to remain on any lot other than one single
family dwelling; (2) no structure of a temporary character ... shall be used on
any lot at any time as a residence; (3) any dwelling erected on any lot or parcel in
said subdivision must contain at least 1400 square feet of floor space on main
floor."
Id. at 869, 415 S.E.2d at 491.
62.

Id.

63. Id. at 870, 415 S.E.2d at 492.
64. Id., 415 S.E.2d at 491.
65. Id. at 871, 415 S.E.2d at 492.
Id.

66.

67. Id.
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DISPOSSESSION

In the only significant dispossession case during the survey period, the
court of appeals based its decision on the rules of interpretation of contracts found in O.C.G.A. section 13-2-2.8 In CM3 v. Associated Realty
Investors/Prado,Inc.,69 the court of appeals interpreted a lease renewal
clause providing for an option "to renew the lease (for a stated period)
without increase in basic rental provided, howeVer, gross sales are over
$1,850,000 during the period of July 1, 1989 through June 30, 1990.""7
Plaintiff landlord maintained that the gross sales requirement in the
provision was a condition precedent to the tenant's option to renew the
lease, and because the requirement was not met, the tenant had no right
to renew the lease and the court should grant the landlord's dispossessory
action. Defendant tenant, however, argued that the gross sales requirement was not a condition precedent, but instead only defined the terms of
the rent upon tenant's exercise of its option to renew the lease." The
court in CM3 rejected defendant's argument and stated that pursuant to
O.C.G.A. section 13-2-2, the gross sales requirement, like any renewal
provision, "must specify the terms and conditions of the renewal... with
such definite terms and certainty that the court may determine what has
been agreed on" by the parties. 7 2 If a renewal provision falls short of this
requirement, it is not enforceable."
The court found that the renewal clause in this case was clear and that
based on the "usual and common" meanings of the words and phrases
used, the gross sales requirement was a condition precedent to the tenant's option to renew the lease.74 Thus, the court of appeals upheld the
grant of dispossessory judgment in favor of plaintiff
trial court's
5
landlord.

Alternately, the court held that even if it had accepted defendant tenant's argument that "failure to meet the gross sales requirement merely
permitted an increase in base rent, then the evidence showed that the
base rent was left to uncertain future ascertainment." 76 If this were the
case, the renewal optional would be unenforceable for lack of certainty."
68. O.C.G.A. § 13-2-2 (1982).
69. 201 Ga. App. 428, 411 S.E.2d 320 (1991).
70. Id. at 428, 411 S.E.2d at 320-21.
71. Id.
72, Id. at 429, 411 S.E.2d at 321.
73. See generally 51 C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant § 56(3)(a) (1968).
74. 201 Ga. App. at 429, 411 S.E.2d at 321.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. (citing McCormick v. Brockett, 167 Ga. App. 325, 306 S.E.2d 344 (1983) and
Krueger v. Paul, 141 Ga. App. 73, 232 S.E.2d 611 (1977)).

1992]

REAL PROPERTY
VI. SALES

355

CONTRACTS AND BROKERS

One significant contract case decided during the survey period was Re/
Max Specialists, Inc. v. Kosakai78, a case in which the court of appeals
considered whether there had been a meeting of the minds when parol
evidence was available to show the -parties' intent.' In this case, the court
reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of broker
Re/Max for a portion of the real estate commission due under an alleged
contract of purchase.80 In Kosakai conflicting affidavits were presented
before the trial court as to the issue of whether there was a meeting of the
minds between Kosakai and Craftmaster Home Corporation with respect
to a contract for Kosakai to purchase a home. The alleged contract had
been considerably marked up, including strikeovers, alterations and the
initials of Kosakai, the potential purchaser. 8 ' The court stated that
[although parol evidence in this case would be inadmissible to establish
a contract for the sale of land, which must be in writing ... or to vary,
modify, or contradict the written terms, . . . in this case there is a writing, taking the transaction at issue out of the statute of frauds."

However, the court stated, "it is impossible to ascertain from the face
of the document [(the contract for purchase and sale)] whether the contract . . . actually represents a meeting of the minds.' s Therefore, the
court in Kosakai held affidavits from both parties were admissible evidence on the issue of intent.8 ' As a result, the case turned on whether a
valid written contract existed between the parties. 85 Citing the Summary
Judgment Act 8 6 for the established procedural rule that a trial court
should not decide issues traditionally left for the jury, the court in
Kosakai held that issues of fact existed, especially concerning the intent
of the parties.87 Therefore, summary judgment was inappropriate, and the
court of appeals reversed the trial court. 8
78. 202 Ga. App. 871, 415 S.E.2d 698 (1992).
79. Id. at 871, 415 S.E.2d at 699.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 871-72, 415 S.E.2d at 699.
82. Id. at 872, 415 S.E.2d at 699 (citing O.C.G.A. § 13-5-30(4)(1982) and Sanders v.
Vaughn, 223 Ga. 274(1), 154 S.E.2d 616 (1967)).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 (1982).
87. 202 Ga. App. at 872, 415 S.E.2d at 699 (citing Scott v. Owens-Illinois, 173 Ga. App.
19, 22-23(3), 325 S.E.2d 402, 405 (1984)).
88. Id.
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In Stelts v. Epperson,"9 the court of appeals further defined the duty of
a real estate broker.90 In Stelts a dispute existed over Stelts' understanding certain facts regarding the Roswell Road right of way abutting the
property purchased by Stelts. As a result of this misunderstanding and
the subsequent effects of road widening on the property, the Stelts
brought suit for breach of fiduciary duty and other claims against broker
Epperson, who had either voluntarily or at the request of the purchaser
ordered a survey of the property. The survey so obtained was "a simple
mortgage survey" that did not show the presence of DOT's right of way
on the subject property; such right of way would have been shown had a
more detailed type of survey been requested. At trial the court granted
summary judgment in favor of Epperson."
In its decision, the court held that because in the normal situation a
broker has a fiduciary duty only to the seller of property, Epperson owed
no such duty to purchaser Stelts.9 2 Nevertheless, Epperson incurred a
duty of reasonable care when he undertook to secure a survey of the
property prior to closing, especially in light of the Stelts' concern about
the effect of potential road construction. As a result, the question of
whether Epperson's actions constituted due care was a question for the
jury; therefore the trial court erred by granting summary judgment. 8
VII.

LANDLORD AND TENANT

Last year's survey included a substantial analysis of landlord-tenant issues because of the large number of cases decided during 1990 and 1991
in this area. During the past year, however, there have been substantially
fewer landlord-tenant cases, although several of them are significant.
In Cho v. South Atlanta Associates, Ltd.,9 4 the court of appeals confronted a tenant's default and abandonment, and the resulting dispute
with the landlord over rent owed under the lease.95 In Cho the issue was
whether the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of
plaintiff-landlord for unpaid rent, taxes and other amounts that the lease
provided would be paid by the tenant when defendant tenant claimed
that the landlord had kept the tenant's equipment and re-leased the
premises prior to the expiration of the tenant's lease term.' 6
89. 201 Ga. App. 405, 411 S.E.2d 281 (1991).
90. Id. at 406, 411 S.E.2d at 282.
91. Id., 411 S.E.2d at 281-82.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 407, 411 S.E.2d at 283.
94. 200 Ga. App. 737, 409 S.E.2d 674 (1991).
95. Id. at 737, 409 S.E.2d 674.
96. Id., 409 S.E.2d at 675. Defendant tenant admitted that it had entered into a three
year lease for space with plaintiff-landlord, but claimed that plaintiff had "retained equip-
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Cho and two partners, doing business as Crystal Cleaners, as tenant,
entered into a lease agreement with South Atlanta Associates for space in
a shopping center to operate a dry cleaning business. The tenant's
monthly rental installments began January 1, 1985, and the tenant
opened for business in February of 1985. Within a year, Cho and partners
closed the business, but continued to pay rent. In February of 1986, the
tenant attempted to remove equipment from the premises by removing
the storefront, but the landlord obtained a temporary restraining order
preventing the tenant "from removing the dry cleaning equipment and
other fixtures in'' the premises. . . for a period of 30 days beginning February 14, 1986.

11

The tenant later removed all of the equipment that could pass through
the doors of the premises, but left large pieces of equipment as a result of
the inability to remove the storefront. The tenant stopped paying rent on
May 1, 1986. In a letter dated June 11, 1986, the landlord notified one of
the tenant's partners that "you are still fully obligated to pay minimum
rent and expenses as defined in [the lease], per month, until such time as
the [p]remises is released." 98 In October 1986, the landlord leased the
premises to another tenant.'9
At trial, the court granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiff. The
court based the ruling in part on the evidence of damages provided by the
landlord's bookkeeper. 10 0 Pointing out that summary judgment is improper when there are genuine issues of material fact, the court of appeals
reversed.' 01 In so ruling, the court held that there were genuine issues of
fact as to (1)the disposition of equipment left on the leased premises by
the tenant; (2) the value of such equipment; and (3) the resulting surplus
or deficiency when that value is offset against the unpaid lease obligation
of the tenant.0 2 As a result of these factual issues, the court held, summary judgment at trial was inappropriate.108
Furthermore, the court held that because the landlord's notice to the
tenant stated that the tenant was "fully obligated to pay minimum rent
ment and personal property belonging to the defendants of a value equal to or in excess of
the claims of the plaintiff, and that plaintiff's retention of such equipment and personal
property has fully discharged defendants" of any liability for rent under the lease. Id.
97. Id. at 738, 409 S.E.2d at 675.
98. Id.

99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. The court stated that "a motion for summary judgment should not be granted
unless it affirmatively appears from the pleadings in evidence that the parties so moving are
entitled to prevail." Id. (citing § O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(c); Finch v. City of Atlanta, 232 Ga. 415,
207 S.E.2d 46 (1974); and Sanders v. Colwell, 248 Ga. 376, 283 S.E.2d 461 (1981)).
102. Id. at 739, 409 S.E.2d at 675-76.
103. Id., 409 S.E.2d at 676.
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and expenses . . . until such time as the [p]remises is released,"'10' there
was also a genuine issue of fact regarding whether the premises were "released" by the landlord's reletting in October 1986.105 For these reasons,
the court of appeals reversed as error the summary judgment granted by
the trial court. 06
Another landlord-tenant case decided during the survey period was
Athens Wheel, Inc. v. Citizens & Southern Trust Co., 0 7 involving a very
complex set of facts. Athens Wheel had leased premises from Elmer
Schacht, and the lease provided for subletting upon ninety days written
notice to the landlord and obtaining the landlord's permission. In August
1985, both parties entered into a sublease for the premises with DeKalb
Tire Company. In the summer of 1987 University Tire purchased the business of DeKalb Tire. However, DeKalb Tire did not obtain the consent
of Schacht's estate before University Tire took possession of the premises, and in the spring of 1988 the estate cancelled the lease with Athens
Wheel and executed a lease with University Tire directly. 0 8
By letter dated April 6, 1988, the estate notified Athens Wheel that the
estate had decided to exercise its option to terminate the lease with Athens Wheel, based on the provision of the lease allowing the estate to terminate the lease upon a subletting made without notice to and consent of
the landlord. Athens Wheel brought suit against the estate, challenging
the estate's right to cancel the original lease and enter into a new one
with University Tire. 0 9
On appeal the court rejected Athens Wheel's argument that it retained
a right of re-entry based on the fact that it had retained in the DeKalb
sublease the ability to cure defaults and had agreed to remain liable to
the estate in the event of default on the part of the sublessee." 0 The
provision in the lease upon which Athens Wheel based its argument provided that "[1]essee hereby subleases and assigns to [s]ublessee and
[s]ublessee hereby accepts and takes from [1]essee all of [l]essee's leasehold interest in the [piremises upon the same terms and conditions as set
out in the Lease and Memorandum.""' The court of appeals stated that
courts must look at the plain meaning of the words of a contract, and the
above language clearly assigns all of Athens Wheel's interest in the prem-

104. Id.

105. Id.
106. Id.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

201 Ga. App. 779, 412 S.E.2d 278 (1991).
Id. at 779, 412 S.E.2d at 278-79.
Id. at 779-80, 412 S.E.2d at 279.
Id. at 780, 412 S.E.2d at 279.
Id.
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ises.112 Based on this finding the court held that if Athens Wheel sought
to retain a right of re-entry, Athens Wheel should have had specific language to that effect in its sublease. " '
Based on this reasoning the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's
grant of summary judgment. " " Nevertheless, it is not clear to the authors
why the court in Athens Wheel places such importance on whether Athens Wheel had retained a right of re-entry, when the issue appears to be
whether the estate had the power after the lapse of some nine months to
terminate the lease based on a subletting without the required ninety
days written notice by Athens Wheel. The authors find it interesting that
the court in Athens Wheel did not address the issue of how long a landlord can wait to exercise its power to cancel the lease based on a subletting without proper notice.
A landlord-tenant case that dealt with an entirely different issue was
Demarest v. Moore, " ' which concerned the issue of landlord liability for
negligence with regard to a burglary in a tenant's apartment." e Demarest
was a tenant at an apartment complex owned and managed by a partnership, owned by Moore and others. The apartments contained deadbolt
locks, but the locks were inadequately attached by screws of improper
length. Furthermore, the apartment complex had a policy against tenants
modifying the deadbolt locks. After the burglary of Demarest's apartment, Demarest brought an action against Moore based on Demarest's
assertion that the apartment management was aware of the deficiently
secured doors. At trial the court granted summary judgment in favor of
defendant Moore. 1
Once again evaluating whether there were genuine issues of material
fact at issue for trial, the court of appeals found that there were jury
issues with respect to "questions of agency, notice, foreseeability, intervening causation, assumption of risk, as well as the'suitability of the lock
in question." 118 The court pointed out that although a landlord is not an
insurer of his tenant's safety, he is not a bystander either.119
In essence, the court in Demarest held that. factual issues involved in
making a determination of negligence were too substantial for a trial
court to grant summary judgment; based on the facts, it seemed possible
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
Id.
Id.
201 Ga. App. 90, 410 S.E.2d 191 (1991).

116. Id. at 90, 410 S.E.2d at 191.
117. Id. at 91, 410 S.E.2d at 191-92.
118. Id. at 92, 410 S.E.2d at 193 (citing Warner v. Arnold, 133 Ga. App. 174, 179, 210
S.E.2d 350, 354 (1974)).

119. Id.
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to the court that a case of negligence might have existed."' The court
also pointed out that "O.C.G.A. section 44-7-1411 provides that 'the land-

lord is responsible for damages arising from defective construction or for
damages arising from the failure to keep the premises in repair.' "1"2
Based on this statutory language, the issue of whether apartment management failed to keep the premises in repair became the pivotal issue for
the proof of negligence, and this was an issue for the jury at trial.
A final significant landlord-tenant case concerned a landlord's claim of
breach of a lease by virtue of nonpayment of rent and a tenant's allegation of constructive eviction.12 2 In SunAmerica Financial, Inc. v. 260
Peachtree Street, Inc.,124 SunAmerica Financial Corporation ("SAF")
leased space from Peachtree Street. The lease was guaranteed by
SunAmerica Corporation ("SAC"), the corporate parent of SAF. 2 5 "The
lease term was to expire in 1996. In April 1989, SAF advised its employees of its decision to move all SAF operations to Los Angeles due to a
change in corporate business goals.

126

In April 1990, an executive of

Broad, the corporate parent to SAC, informed landlord Peachtree Street
of this decision to relocate and vacate the rented premises by October
1990.127

SAF subsequently completed its move from the premises around November 1990, but continued to pay rent. At the same time, SAF continued its attempts to sublease the premises. The leased premises contained
a great deal of asbestos, some of which applied directly to structural supports and decking, and SAF continually sought to persuade Peachtree
Street to remove the asbestos. SAF and Peachtree Street held meetings,
and SAF suggested to Peachtree Street that SAF be permitted to renovate each of the twelve floors in the leased premises as they became vacant, and to return each floor to a completely open space to improve the
12
chances of subleasing the space. 8

When Peachtree Street refused to approve the renovation and refused
to consider the question of asbestos abatement without a specific subtenant and formal renovation plan, SAF gave assurances in writing to Peach120. Id.
121. O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14 (1982).
122. 201 Ga. App. at 92, 410 S.E.2d at 193 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14). See generally
Thompson v. Crownover, 259 Ga. 126, 381 S.E.2d 283 (1989).
123. SunAmerica Fin., Inc. v. 260 Peachtree St., Inc., 202 Ga. App. 790, 415 S.E.2d 677
(1992).
124. 202 Ga. App. 790, 415 S.E.2d 677 (1992).
125. Id. at 790, 415 S.E.2d at 678-79.
126. Id. at 791, 415 S.E.2d at 679.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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tree Street that promised appropriate action with respect to the space.'"
Peachtree Street did not reply to the proposal prior to November 30,
1990, at which time Peachtree Street received a letter from a director of
SAF (and senior legal advisor of Broad) stating that "as of December 1,
1990, we are withholding our rental payments under the lease because of
[Peachtree Street's] failure to fulfill its obligations under the Lease." 3 0
SAF thereafter declined to pay further rent under the lease. 81
Citing its earlier ruling in Sun Insurance Services v. 260 Peachtree
3
Street, Inc.,3'
the court of appeals found that the lease at issue carried
an implied requirement "that the landlord not refuse consent to changes
that are of equal or greater quality than the original condition of the
premises. "M The court also found that the removal of the asbestos "will
certainly enhance the value of [the building]."1 84 The court continued by
stating that "[w]e are satisfied that SAF's renovation proposal substantially complied with the terms of the lease."13 ' The court further held
that SAF's proposed renovation, "although so extensive as to require a
virtual gutting of all floors,""" was nonetheless consistent with SAF's
right to sublease the premises, which right was one of the distinct purposes for which the lease was originally executed. 3 7 Thus, the court
deemed Peachtree Street's refusal to consent to the proposed renovation
unreasonable. " "
The other important issue in Peachtree Street was whether Peachtree
Street's refusal to remove the asbestos from the leased premises constituted a constructive eviction, thereby relieving SAF of its obligation to
pay rent.139 The trial court concluded on motion for summary judgment

129. Id. at 791-92, 415 S.E.2d at 679-80. SAF gave assurances to the effect that
(1) that any improvements by any subtenant would equal or exceed the quality of
the original condition of the premises or (2) in the event [SAF] was unable to
sublease the space, it would improve the space to a condition equal to the original
condition of the leased space prior to the termination of [SAF's] lease. Further
.I if the landlord is unwilling to accept [SAF's] assurances that it will meet the
standard provided by the lease, (SAF] is prepared to give a bond, letter of credit,
or some similar financial assurance in support of its obligation to the landlord as a
condition of the landlord approving the plans.
Id. at 792, 415 S.E.2d at 679-80.
130. Id. at 792, 415 S.E.2d at 680.
131. Id.
132. 192 Ga. App. 482, 385 S.E.2d 127 (1989).
133. 202 Ga. App. at 792, 415 S.E.2d at 680.
134. Id. See 192 Ga. App. at 483, 385 S.E.2d at 129.
135. 202 Ga. App. at 792, 415 S.E.2d at 680.
136. Id. at 793, 415 S.E.2d at 680.
137. Id.
138. Id. See 192 Ga. App. at 484, 385 S.E.2d at 129.
139. 202 Ga. App. at 793, 415 S.E.2d at 681.
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that no such constructive eviction had occurred. 4 0 The appeals court
pointed out that a "classic" constructive eviction in a commercial setting
is one in which the landlord allows the premises to deteriorate to the
point that the tenant can no longer carry on the business or purpose for
be
which the premises were rented, and when appropriate repairs cannot
4
made without a substantial interruption of the tenant's business.1 1
However, the court pointed out, constructive eviction can occur in situations when there has not been such substantial deterioration, but when
the tenant's plight has risen beyond the level of "uncomfortable.' 14 The
court cited earlier rulings, holding that a constructive eviction, in order to
operate as a suspension of rent, must be "either an actual expulsion of
the tenant, or some act of a grave and permanent character done by the
landlord with the intention of depriving the tenant of the enjoyment of
the demised premises."' 4 3 The court ruled that questions as to whether an
act is permanent or serious enough, or was done14with the requisite intent,
are genuine issues of fact for a jury to decide.
A genuine issue of fact existed in Peachtree Street as to whether SAF
ultimately relinquished its right of use and enjoyment of the leased premises based on Peachtree Street's conduct, or whether SAF had already
decided to relinquish its rights as a result of its own business reorganization." 16 As to Peachtree Street's conduct, the court determined, by examining the lease language carefully, that the right of subleasing the premises was one of the significant purposes for which the lease was entered
into by SAF; that Peachtree Street's unreasonable refusal to consent to
the tenant's proposed renovation and its related refusal to abate the asbestos until SAF found a subtenant who insisted on remodeling did not
shield Peachtree Street from a legal obligation to remove the asbestos;
and that such obligation to remove arose "immediately upon its unrea' Therefore, the court of appeals found error
sonable refusal to consent."""
140. Id.
141. Id. at 793-794, 415 S.E.2d at 681 (citing Overstreet v. Rhodes, 212 Ga. 521, 93
S.E.2d 715 (1956)).
142. Id. at 794, 415 S.E.2d at 681.
143. Id. (citing Potts-Thompson Liquor Co. v. Capital City Tobacco Co., 137 Ga. 648, 74
S.E. 279 (1912) and Rains Inv. Co. v. George Roe & Assoc., 140 Ga. App. 566, 231 S.E.2d 460

(1976)).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 795, 415 S.E.2d at 682. There was a great deal of conflicting evidence concerning the reasons for SAF's decision to move from the premises and SAF's subsequent decision to attempt to sublease the premises. In addition, there was evidence that SAF ceased
paying rent only after Peachtree Street had refused to consent to SAF's proposed renovations and had refused to remove the asbestos in the leased premises. Id.
146. Id. The court found an additional issue of fact with respect to whether Peachtree
Street's conduct merely rendered the tenant's use of the premises "uncomfortable" or unfit
for use and enjoyment for the purposes intended. Id. at 796, 415 S.E.2d at 682-83.
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in the trial court's grant of summary judgment and returned the case to
the trial level for determination of these factual issues."'
VIII.

LAND USE AND ZONING

Georgia courts decided few cases concerning land use and zoning during
the past year, and only one of them, Atlanta Bio-Med, Inc. v. DeKalb
County,"48 is discussed in this survey. In Atlanta Bio-Med, the supreme
court applied several zoning statutes to the process of a zoning text
amendment and subsequent rescission of that amendment. 4 9
The facts of Atlanta Bio-Med are concise. In 1990 Atlanta Bio-Med,
Inc. was created for the purpose of constructing and operating a medical
waste facility. When the organizers of Atlanta Bio-Med were informed
that no zoning classification existed under which a medical waste facility
could be constructed in DeKalb County, the organizers submitted an application for a text amendment to the Dekalb County zoning ordinance,
which "would allow medical waste incinerators in commercial and heavy
industrial zoning districts."5 After extensive review and research, the
planning department recommended a text amendment that would in substance accomplish the desires of the organizers. After the proper public
notice and hearings, the DeKalb County Board of Commissioners approved the text amendment. Soon after, however, the Board of Commissioners undertook to rescind the text amendment due to heavy public
pressure against construction of a medical waste incinerator in DeKalb
County." 1
Atlanta Bio-Med then filed a complaint seeking a judgment declaring
the rescission of the text amendment void. In addition, Atlanta Bio-Med
sought injunctive relief and a writ of mandamus requiring the grant of a
permit to build and operate a medical waste incinerator. 52 At trial, the
court denied all relief to Atlanta Bio-Med on the grounds that the text
amendment had not been properly enacted, and therefore the subsequent
rescission had no effect. The trial court held that because the text amendment in effect rezoned a property (the property owned by Atlanta BioMed), O.C.G.A. section 36-66-4(b)158 and O.C.G.A. section 36-67-5,15 4 re147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 796, 415 S.E.2d at 683.
261 Ga. 594, 408 S.E.2d 100 (1991).
Id. at 594, 405 S.E.2d at 100.
Id., 408 S.E.2d at 101.
Id.
Id. at 594-95, 408 S.E.2d at 102.
O.C.G.A. § 36-66-4(b) (Supp. 1992).
Id. § 36-67-5.
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quiring certain notice and other procedural steps, were applicable and
should have been followed.1 55
The trial court's decision was reversed, however, on appea. 15 1 Reasoning that the notice requirements of O.C.G.A. section 36-66-4(b) apply
only when a zoning decision affects a single parcel or limited number of
parcels of property, the supreme court held that the statute was inapplicable in the instant situation. 57 In other words, the text amendment at
issue had general application, not specific application to a specific parcel
or parcels. Therefore, although the organizers of Atlanta Bio-Med had a
specific parcel of property for development of their medical waste incinerator, the text amendment would have been a general amendment of the
zoning code rather than a "zoning decision" within the definition provided by the statute.'
The court also deemed inapplicable the provisions of O.C.G.A. section
36-67-5, which required analysis of several factors as set forth in O.C.G.A.
section 36-67-3,5" demonstrating how a proposed zoning change will affect "adjacent and nearby property."' 0 Once again, the court found that
O.C.G.A. section 36-67-5, like O.C.G.A. section 36-66-4(b), applies only
when a specific rezoning takes place, not in the case of a general text
amendment. 16' The court reasoned, in the event of a text amendment,
there is no specific "adjacent and nearby property" and therefore no reason to comply with O.C.G.A. section 36-67-5.11

IX.

EMINENT DOMAIN AND CONDEMNATION

In last year's survey, the authors discussed the case of Gomez v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority,"s in which the court of appeals reversed a directed verdict in favor of defendant Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority ("MARTA") in an inverse condemnation
action.'" Plaintiffs had brought an inverse condemnation action against
MARTA as a result of the noise and vibration from the Southern Railway
155. 261 Ga. at 595, 408 S.E.2d at 102. O.C.G.A. § 36-66-4(b) provides that in the event
of a "rezoning of property," the local government must publish the location of the property
to be rezoned and post a sign on that property for at least 15 days prior to such rezoning
hearing. O.C.G.A. § 36-66-4(b).
156. 261 Ga. at 595, 408 S.E.2d at 102.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. O.C.G.A. § 36-67-3 (Supp. 1992).
160. 261 Ga. App. at 595, 408 S.E.2d at 102.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 595-96, 408 S.E.2d at 102.
163. 197 Ga. App. 834, 399 S.E.2d 536 (1990).
164. Id. at 834, 399 S.E.2d at 536.
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right of way abutting plaintiffs' property. Southern Railway moved its
tracks fifty feet closer to the plaintiffs' property, but still within the right
of way, during the construction of MARTA's north line. In addition,
MARTA had constructed a thirty foot high embankment between plaintiffs' property and the right of way. Based on this evidence, the trial court
directed a verdict for MARTA and stated that no inverse condemnation
action results from the increased or changed 'use of an existing right of
way.' 6 5 On appeal, the court of appeals reversed, holding that the increased or changed use of a right of way may constitute a taking for compensation as constitutionally required.166
In this survey year, Gomez reached the supreme court. In MARTA v.
Gomez,16 7 the supreme court granted a writ of certiorari to consider
whether the increased or changed use of a right of way should constitute
a taking for which compensation will be required.166 Finding that "it has
long been the law of Georgia that railroads constructed and operated
properly may not be deemed a nuisance by the Courts,'"" the supreme
court held that the use of the right of way was customary and proper. 70
As a result, the court concluded that the railroad operations were not a
nuisance, and that the plaintiff-appellees had no right to recover against
MARTA in an inverse condemnation action.'
It is apparent from this
ruling that Georgia courts may impose an especially difficult burden of
proof upon a plaintiff in cases involving a challenge to the use of a right
of way, especially the use of a railroad right of way. 72
Another condemnation case decided during the survey period was Department of Transportation v. Calfee,i l7 in which the Georgia Depart-

165. Id.

166. Id., 399 S.E.2d at 537.
167. 261 Ga. 617, 409 S.E.2d 35 (1991). In this case, the court distinguished MARTA v.
Trussell, 247 Ga. 148, 273 S.E.2d 859 (1981), in which the supreme court ruled that eminent
domain could not take an easement merely to damage property. 261 Ga. at 618, 409 S.E.2d
at 36. The alternatives available to the condemnor in Trussell were different from those in
the instant case; therefore Trussell was distinguishable. Id. Likewise, the court in Gomez
distinguished Duffield v. DeKalb County, 242 Ga. 432, 249 S.E.2d 235 (1978), because Duffield concerned an "increased" use of a right of way, whereas the instant case concerned a
different use of an existing right of way rather than any sort of increase in usage. 261 Ga.
App. at 618, 409 S.E.2d at 36.
168. 261 Ga. App. at 617, 409 S.E.2d at 36.
169. Id. at 618, 409 S.E.2d at 36 (citing Georgia R.R. v. Maddox, 116 Ga. 64, 42 S.E. 315

(1902)).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. The court in Gomez concluded that "although appellees followed the correct
procedure in seeking compensation, the facts of this case and the long-standing law of this
state regarding the use of a railroad right of way mandate the denial of their claim." Id.
173. 202 Ga. App. 299, 414 S.E.2d 268 (1991).
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ment of Transportation ("DOT") condemned 0.37 acres of land in
Catoosa County in order to restructure the 1-75/Cloud Springs Road interchange. At the time of condemnation, a convenience store owned by
Calfee Company of Dalton d/b/a Favorite Markets was located on the
property. Bernice Calfee and Priscilla Calfee Mowles, as trustees under A
trust established by George Calfee, who previously owned the property at
issue, leased the property to the Calfee Company of Dalton d/b/a Favorite Markets in October 1981.'1"
In December 1981, George Calfee, Bernice Calfee, and Priscilla Calfee
Mowles sold Favorite Markets to Seaboard Operating ("Seaboard"), an
investment company. Prior to consummation of the sale, the purchaser
insisted on establishing a fixed rental for the ten year lease renewal,
which was a lease agreement schedule incorporated into the purchase and
sale agreement.

17 5

Prior to the condemnation trial, the fee owners had accepted the
amount offered by the DOT as the value of the unencumbered fee for the
subject property, but the value of the leasehold interest remained in dispute.17 6 "At the close of evidence, the DOT moved for a directed verdict
on the issues of the leasehold interest and business losses."' 77 The trial
court denied the motion, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Seaboard, awarding $100,000 to Seaboard for the leasehold interest, but denied recovery for business losses because the business operated by Seaboard was not unique. The DOT appealed the trial court decision.178
On appeal the court of appeals held, as to this issue, that the intent of
the parties as expressed in the entire lease contract governed the interpretation of a lease provision, and that no construction of a lease provision is necessary or even permissible when the language of that lease is
clear and unambiguous. 7" As a result of strict construction of the lease
provisions, the tenant had no claim against the landlord for the unexpired
lease term, and the tenant was not entitled to any part of the condemnation award. 8 0 The lease provision at issue provided that:
In the event any part or all of the premises shall be taken for any
public or quasi-public use under any statute or by right of eminent domain or private purchase in lieu thereof by a public body vested with
174. Id. at 299, 414 S.E.2d at 269.
175. Id. at 300, 414 S.E.2d at 269.
176. Id., 414 S.E.2d at 270.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 301, 414 S.E.2d at 270 (citing Sterns Gallery v. Corporate Property, 176 Ga.
App. 586, 337 S.E.2d 29 (1985) and Peachtree on Peachtree Ifivestors v. Reed Drug Co., 251
Ga. 692, 308 S.E.2d 825 (1983)).
180. Id.
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power of eminent domain, then, when possession shall have been taken
thereunder of the premises or any part thereof, this lease shall terminate
and all rights of the tenant hereunder shall immediately cease and terminate, and the accrued rent shall be paid up to the time of such termination, and the tenant shall have no claim against the landlord for the
value of the unexpired term hereof and the tenant shall not be entitled
to any part of the condemnation award or purchase price.""
The DOT contended that this provision assigned to the landlord all
claims that the tenant had for value of its leasehold interest upon condemnation.18 2 The court found that the provision quoted herein "neither
waives any and all claims arising from the lease termination nor does it
assign any and all condemnation awards or claims, whatsoever, to the
landlord."1 8 Therefore, tenant Seaboard had not assigned to its landlord
any of the claims that Seaboard would have had for value of the leasehold
interest.'"
At trial, the DOT had further challenged the condemnation award
based on the leasehold interest, arguing that the court based the award
entirely on a renewal term which was ambiguous and unclear."1s The
DOT asserted that any attempted extension of the lease was invalid due
to lack of certainty of the lease terms, and the trial court had agreed.
Because the rental rate for the extension period was uncertain, the trial
court found that the purported lease extension was unenforceable. Furthermore, because the extension was unenforceable, the tenant had no
legally compensable interest in the property, and therefore compensation
for condemnation was not required. 8 "
Seaboard, on the other hand, contended that it and its landlord entered
into subsequent agreements, which established a ten percent increase in
the rental rate, thereby modifying the lease and making the renewal term
enforceable. The DOT countered that the"agreements were unenforceable
because they were not written and therefore violated the statute of
frauds. However, the lawyer for Seaboard had written a letter to the land-

181. Id. at 300-01, 414 S.E.2d at 270. This language was cited by the DOT in arguing
that Seaboard retained no interest in the condemnation proceeds. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 301, 414 S.E.2d at 270.
184. Id. at 302, 414 S.E.2d at 271.
185. Id. The renewal provision of the lease stated that
[t]enant shall ... have the option to renew this lease for an additional ten (10)
year period by giving landlord notice of its intent to renew in writing not later
than three (3) months prior to the expiration of the original term of this lease.
Tenant shall pay to landlord rental during the renewal period upon terms that are
mutually agreeable.
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lord, expressing Seaboard's intention to comply with the agreed upon ten
percent rental rate increase in 1991 (which would be the year in which the
renewal would take effect), and, as to this issue, the court found that this
letter was sufficient to establish the intent of the parties with respect to
187
the lease extension.
As a result, stated the court, the "writings when construed together adequately disclose the contract subject matter, the parties thereto (both
promisee and promisor), and, all terms and undertaking thereof."' 188
Therefore, it was apparent that the parties intended and carried out a
written modification of their original lease and rendered the renewal provision of that' lease certain and enforceable as between those parties.' 89
Taking into consideration all of the evidence, the court of appeals
found that the lease provision at issue was enforceable and that Seaboard
had a measurable leasehold interest in the property. 90 The court further
concluded that "[a]s neither party to the lease can assert the lack of enforceability of the lease renewal against the other, as to them it would be
an enforceable lease renewal."1 91 Accordingly, the court rejected the
DOT's assertion that the lease provision was unenforceable; the court also
rejected the DOT's reliance on several other cases that involved a lack of
certainty in lease terms and a resulting reduction in value of the leasehold interest.' 2 Therefore, the landlord and tenant were legally bound to
comply with terms of the lease and the renewal, and the DOT was properly required to pay compensation based on the leasehold interest of the
tenant." 3
In his dissent, Judge Pope asserted that the majority's conclusion, that
the condemnation paragraph of the lease did not assign the tenant's share
of condemnation proceeds to the landlord, was incorrect.' 4 Judge Pope
argued that the lease provision was clear in providing that "the [t]enant
shall not be entitled to any part of the condemnation award or purchase
price." 95 Finding this language to be clear and unambiguous, Judge Pope
further argued that the property owners were entitled to the value of an
unencumbered fee in the property, including the value of the tenant's
leasehold interest and any other interest in the property."' Furthermore,
Judge Pope suggested that the tenant had clearly relinquished any right
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id. at 302-03, 414 S.E.2d at 272.
Id. at 304, 414 S.E.2d at 272.
Id.
Id. at 306, 414 S.E.2d at 274.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (Pope, J., dissenting).
Id. at 307, 414 S.E.2d at 274 (Pope, J., dissenting).
Id.
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to seek a portion of the197condemnation proceeds and was now seeking to
avoid that forbearance.
In his conclusion, Judge Pope argued that condemning authorities
will no longer be able to rely on the clear contract provisions concerning
assignment of rights of condemnation proceeds, but will be forced to
have the property appraised as both an unencumbered fee and an encumbered fee with a leasehold interest and seek court direction concerning which party is entitled to compensation.'""
Joining in the dissent, three judges suggested that this issue of interpretation of the condemnation clause is an issue that warrants further
consideration. 99 A clear assignment by the tenant to the landlord of the
tenant's rights in all condemnation awards would have justified the conclusions of the dissentors, but the authors were unable to find any such
assignment in the lease language quoted in the opinions. The problem
arises because the lease language did not go on to say whether the tenants' lack of "entitlement to any part of the condemnation award
. ",200 applied only to the awards made by the condemnor to the landlord or to a separate award that the tenant should have been able to
claim from the condemnor.
X.

MISCELLANEOUS CASES

In an unusual case, the court of appeals held that a landowner is not
liable for the diversion or obstruction of surface water unless that landowner somehow alters the natural flow of the water by artificial means.2"'
In Bracey v. King, 02 the appellee-developer had sold to appellant a parcel of land upon which a natural stream traversed, and a portion of that
property was in a flood plain. Subsequent to purchase of the property,
water began backing up onto the appellant's lot because of dams constructed downstream by beavers. The appellee-developer tried on several
occasions to destroy the dams, but the beavers continued to reconstruct
the dams, and the water damage to appellant's property continued. '
Appellant brought an action against appellee-developer to recover for
flood damage to the property."0 4 At trial, the court granted summary
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. 202 Ga. App. at 302, 414 S.E.2d at 270.
201. Bracey v. King, 199 Ga. App. 831, 406 S.E.2d 265 (1991).
202. 199 Ga. App. 831, 406 S.E.2d 265 (1991).
203. Id. at 831, 406 S.E.2d at 265.
204. Id. Appellant did not allege that she or any of her agents were denied permission to
enter upon appellee-developer's property, or that they were denied permission to attempt to
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judgment in favor of appellee-developer, based on the finding that the
dams were a natural destruction and there was no legal obligation upon
appellee-developer to remove such obstruction.'05
On appeal, the court pointed out that the trial court was correct in its
conclusion that the beaver dams were natural obstructions, rather than
artificially created ones. 2 " Furthermore, the court found no merit in appellant's argument that the appellee-developer was responsible for the
beaver dams by allowing the beavers "to exist for the length of time it
took to damage appellant's lot and decrease its value."2' 0' Citing established precedent in Georgia, the court held that "[a] riparian owner is not
to be held responsible for the effects of the forces of nature . . . and he
owes no duty either to a lower or to an upper riparian owner to remove
[natural] obstructions." 20 As a result, appellee-developer bore no responsibility for the actions of the beavers and furthermore had no liability
based on the downstream dams that caused water to backflow onto appellant's property2 0 1
In a mechanic's lien case, the court of appeals held that a mechanic's or
materialman's response to a general contractor's request for help extended the time period within which the lien must be filed.2 10 The court
held that checkups or repairs performed by a mechanic or materialman at
the owner's or contractor's request constituted furnishing of labor for
purposes of determining whether a lien filing is timely pursuant to
statute.21
Finally, the authors feel it appropriate to mention the United States
Supreme Court decision in Lucas v. South CarolinaCoastal Council,2 1 2 in
which the Court held that when a government regulation deprives a property owner of all economically viable use of the property, the government
must compensate the property owner for a taking under the Fifth
Amendment 2 18 However, the Court narrowed the decision by finding that
when the regulation merely codifies existing restrictions on title to property or the uses of the property, then no, taking has occurred.2 4 Although

remove the dams. Appellant sought only to recover for the alleged flood damage caused by

the downstream dams. Id.
205. Id.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
S.E.2d
211.
212.

Id., 406 S.E.2d at 266.
Id. at 832, 406 S.E.2d at 266.
Id. (citing Parrish v. Parrish, 21 Ga. App. 275, 94 S.E. 315 (1917)).
Id..
Schwan's Sales Enter. v. Martin Mechanical Contractors, 202 Ga. App. 510, 414
727 (1992).
Id. at 511, 414 S.E.2d at 728.
112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).

213. Id. at 2889.
214. Id. at 2901.

REAL PROPERTY
Lucas is a decision affecting only one specific situation in South Carolina,
Georgia practitioners should become familiar with the decision. Lucas is
the first significant takings case decided by the Court in several years,
and the decision may signify a renewed interest in takings law with respect to state coastal regulations, an increasingly volatile area of law in
Georgia.
XI.

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

Several Georgia legislative enactments during the survey period are deserving of inclusion here. First among these is the Georgia Uniform Conservation Easement Act.2" The act redefined a conservation easement to
mean a nonpossessory interest in real property that imposes restrictions
and obligations upon the holder for several purposes, including: (i) protecting natural scenic or open space values of real property; (ii) enhancing
the air or water quality of such property; (iii) preserving the historical,
archaeological or other related aspects of the property; or (iv) ensuring
the availability of the property for specific uses deemed beneficial to the
21
community. 6
Pursuant to the act, a conservation easement is valid even when its
benefit does not touch or concern the property, or when the easement
imposes a negative burden upon the property.2 17 In addition, the easement is valid when it imposes obligations upon the owner of the burdened
property.2 '8 Finally, a property owner who records a conservation easement serves notice to the county board of tax assessors, which will entitle
the owner to a revaluation of the property to reflect the impact of the
conservation easement.2 1
Another act that warrants brief mention is the amendment of O.C.G.A.
section 11-9-31020 to provide that liens for unpaid taxes or judgments are
to receive the same priority with regard to collateral as if such liens or
judgments were a conflicting security interest pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 11-9-312,21, which provides for priority of security interests based on
time of filing or perfection. 22
215. O.C.G.A. § 44-10-1 (1982 & Stipp. 1992).
216. Id. § 44-10-2 (Supp. 1992).
217. Id. § 44-10-5.
218. Id.
219. Id. § 44-10-8. It is important to note, however, that the conservation easement will
not impair an interest in real property that existed at the time of the creation of the conservation easement. Id.
220. Id. § 11-9-310.
221. Id. § 11-9-312.
222. See generally Id. (priorities among conflicting security interests) and Id. § 11-9-313
(1982) (priority of security interests in fixtures).
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The role of the corporate seal in the transfer of real estate by corporations has been greatly diminished by House Bill No. 1612228 that, among
other things, amended O.C.G.A. section 14-5-7114 to provide that when an
instrument is executed for a corporate conveyance of an interest in real
property, execution by the president or vice president and an attestation
or countersignature by the secretary, an assistant secretary, or the cashier
or assistant cashier shall be conclusive evidence that (i) such president or
vice president occupies the official position indicated; (ii) such signature
is genuine; and (iii) the execution of the document on behalf of the corporation has been duly authorized. The affixing of the corporate seal is not
2
necessary to create such conclusive evidence. 2
House Bill No. 1612 also amended O.C.G.A. section 14-2-151221 with
respect to the execution and sealing of corporate documents generally (including conveyance documents) and with respect to the reliance that
third parties without knowledge or reason to know to the contrary may
2 27
place on corporate documents executed as specified in the statute.
It is significant to note that the legislature passed five acts during the
survey period concerning environmental matters. These five acts, taken
together, demonstrate the state's increasing concern with environmental
issues, and passage of the legislation further serves as notice to real estate
practitioners of the significance of environmental matters with respect to
the practice of real property law.
Among the environmental acts passed were: (1) House Bill No. 1394,22
which amended the Hazardous Waste Management Act 29 (concerning
owners and operators of solid waste disposal facilities and other matters);
(2) House Bill No. 1846,210 which amended O.C.G.A. section 43-51-3281 by
adding a seventh member to the State Board of Examiners for certification of water and waste water treatment plant operators, the member to
be from the private sector industrial community;28 2 (3) House Bill No.
1364,22 which repealed a 1991 act requiring Fulton County residential
developers to obtain a certificate of approval prior to developing within
500 feet of any lake in a residential area;284 (4) House Bill No. 1386,38
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

1992 Ga. Laws 1180.
O.C.G.A. § 14-5-7 (Supp. 1992).
Id.
Id. § 14-2-151.
Id.
1992 Ga. Laws 2234.
O.C.G.A. § 12-8-60 (1992).

230.

1992 Ga. Laws. 2518.

231. O.C.G.A. § 43-51-3 (1982).
232. Id.
233. 1992 Ga. Laws 5730.
234. Id.
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which amended O.C.G.A. sections 12-8-22,113 12-8-27" '8 and 12-8-40,231 all

relating to solid waste management facilities and related matters; ' (5)
House Resolution No. 789,' 40 which provides for continuation of the
Georgia Wetlands Conservation Study Committee created in 1991, providing for membership of the Committee, which shall make its report
prior to December 31, 1992, and then be abolished; ' 4' and (6), in particular, the Georgia Hazardous Site Response Act, codified at O.C.G.A. sections 12-8-90,142 which provides for instrument and county record notices
when the owner of an interest in property is aware of the disposal of hazardous waste or similar substances on that property.2 '
XII.

CONCLUSION

In general, fewer cases and legislative acts developed during the survey
period than last year. However, several cases among these, notably some
in the areas of foreclosure, contracts and breach, and landlord-tenant,
may have a substantial impact on the practice of real property law in the
future. Perhaps most notable is the increasing concern of the state legislature with environmental matters. The authors expect that these environmental enactments may cause substantial concern to owners of real property having environmental problems and will likely lead to significant
litigation.

235.

1992 Ga. Laws 3276.

236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

O.C.G.A. § 12-8-22 (1992).
Id. § 12-8-27.
Id. § 12-8-40.
1992 Ga. Laws 3276.
1992 Ga. Laws 3099.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 12-8-90 (1992).
Id.

